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Abstract
We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources,
and each player’s strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies
a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable routing flow games and also job allocation
games. The congestion of a resource is the sum of the weights of the players that use it and the
player’s cost function is the sum of the utilities of the resources on its strategy. The social cost
is the total weighted sum of the player’s costs. The quality of Nash equilibria is determined by
the price of anarchy (PoA) which expresses how much worse is the social outcome in the worst
equilibrium versus the optimal coordinated solution. In the literature the predominant work
has only been on games with polynomial utility costs, where it has been proven that the price
of anarchy is bounded by the degree of the polynomial. However, no results exist on general
bounds for non-polynomial utility functions.
Here, we consider general versions of these games in which the utility of each resource is an
arbitrary non-decreasing function of the congestion. In particular, we consider a large family
of superpolynomial utility functions which are asymptotically larger than any polynomial. We
demonstrate that for every such function there exist games for which the price of anarchy is
unbounded and increasing with the number of players (even if they have infinitesimal weights)
while network resources remain fixed. We give tight lower and upper bounds which show this
dependence on the number of players. Furthermore we provide an exact characterization of the
PoA of all congestion games whose utility costs are bounded above by a polynomial function.
Heretofore such results existed only for games with polynomial cost functions.
1 Introduction
We consider non-cooperative congestion games on a set of resources which are shared among players.
A player’s strategy consists of a subset (or all) of the resources where it applies a fixed weight.
Strategies of players are pure in the sense that each player picks one strategy among a set of
available strategies. The resource utilization is unsplittable within a strategy, since a player applies
the same weight on each resource. The congestion of a resource is simply the sum of the weights
of the players that use it. The utility of each resource is a function of its congestion. Each player
selfishly minimizes its own cost which is the sum of the utilities of all the resources along its strategy.
We examine pure Nash equilibria which are game states where each player has chosen a locally
optimal strategy from which there is no better alternative strategy. Rosenthal [18] shows that if all
players have the same weight then pure Nash equilibria always exist. There may be multiple Nash
equilibria for the same game. The quality of a Nash equilibrium is measured with respect to the
social cost function which is simply the weighted sum of the all the players’ costs. We measure the
impact of the selfishness of the players with the price of anarchy which is the ratio of the social
cost of the worst Nash equilibrium versus the coordinated optimal social cost.
Resource congestion games can represent network flow games and job distribution games. In
networks, each resource corresponds to a link. A player with weight w represents a routing request
from a source node to a destination node of demand w which is fulfilled along a path of the network.
The utility cost of the player relates to the delay for sending the demand in the network along the
chosen route. In job distribution games, each resource represents a machine. Each player has a job
that consists of small sub-tasks that can execute at each node. The weight of the player w relates to
the work to be assigned to each machine in order to execute the job. The cost of the player relates
to the delay to finish its job. In both the network and job games, the price of anarchy represents
the impact of selfishness to the overall performance of the system, which in one case is the total
network delay, and in the other the total work to execute all jobs.
Congestion games were introduced and studied in [16, 18]. Most of the literature considers
linear or polynomial utility functions. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [12] introduced the notion
of price of anarchy in the specific parallel link networks model in which they provide the bound
PoA = 3/2. Roughgarden and Tardos [22] provided the first result for splittable flows in general
networks in which they showed that PoA ≤ 4/3. Pure equilibria with atomic flow have been studied
in [2, 4, 10, 5, 13, 24] for classic congestion games and their variations of botteleck games (where
the cost is determined by the maximum congested edge), and with splittable flow in [19, 20, 22, 23].
Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17], and with splittable
flow in [6, 8].
2 Contributions: Functional Characterization of PoA Bounded-
ness
Let L = {l1(x), l2(x), . . .} denote a class of arbitrary non-decreasing latency cost functions.
Definition 1. Function lk(x) ∈ L is defined to be a superpolynomial function if it cannot be bounded
from above by some polynomial function xp i.e 6 ∃p : limx→∞
lk(x)
xp → 0
We also define our notion of boundedness for the Price of Anarchy.
Definition 2. The Price of Anarchy of a congestion game G is bounded if it does not arbitrarily
increase with the number of players.
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Under our notion of boundedness, the Price of Anarchy depends only on intrinsic game param-
eters such as the parameters of the latency cost function, player strategies etc. but is independent
of the number of players. Consider for example a game with 2 resources and n players who can use
either resource. The PoA is 1 and independent of n. In this paper, we prove the existence of a large
class of latency functions for which there exist games in which the PoA increases with the number
of players while other network parameters such as network topology or number of resources, player
weights and cost functions remain fixed.
Let G be an unsplittable congestion game with player weights derived from weight set W ⊆ R+
and latency cost functions derived from L. We assume that W is bounded by w = (maxi ∈ W )
representing the weight of the largest player. For any function lk() ∈ L, define the set of ordered
triples
Ok =
{
(x, y, z)k ∈ R
3|x > y > z, 0 < z 6 w,
lk(x+ z)
lk(x)
=
x
y
}
(1)
As per the usual convention, for any ordered triple (j, t, i) ∈ R3, we denote (j, t, i) > (x, t, i)k if
j > x. Next, for each lk(), we define two special parameters:
g∗k = max
(x,y,z)k∈Ok
{
lk(x+ z)
lk(y)
}
(2)
ĝk = max
x∈R+,y>z
lk(x+ z)
lk(y)
−
xlk(x)
ylk(y)
(3)
Let the ordered triple values at g∗k and ĝ be denoted by (j
∗, t∗, i∗)k and (jˆ, tˆ, iˆ)k, respectively, i.e
g∗k = lk(j
∗ + i∗)/lk(t
∗) and ĝk =
lk(jˆ+iˆ)
lk(tˆ)
− jˆlk(jˆ)
tˆlk(tˆ)
. Note that (jˆ, tˆ, iˆ) 6 (j∗, t∗, i∗) since both lk(x+ z)
and xlk(x) are increasing in j and hence by definition of the ordered triple (x, y, z)k we must have
ĝk 6 g
∗
k.
We consider three disjoint subclasses of latency functions from L as described below and evaluate
their PoA bounds.
• L1 = {lk ∈ L|∀i ∈ R
+ limx→∞
lk(x+i)
lk(x)
> 1}. Thus L1 contains superpolynomial functions such
as lk(x) = ak2
x, lk(x) = akx
x etc. with coefficient ak > 0.
• L2 = {lk ∈ L|lk(x) = ak · e
log1+ǫ x}, where ǫ > 0 is any constant, coefficient ak > 0 and log
refers to the natural logarithm. The functions in L2 are superpolynomials with the property
limx→∞
lk(x+i)
lk(x)
= 1. Thus L2 contains slower growing superpolynomial functions such as
lk(x) = akx
log x, lk(x) = akx
log2 x etc.
• L3 is the class of non-superpolynomial increasing functions inclusive of and bounded from
above by polynomials, for example, lk(x) = (
∑d
q=0 aqx
q)(
∑d
q=0 bq log
q x).
Our first result is an exact bound on the Price of Anarchy of unsplittable congestion games.
Result 1. For every subset of cost functions L′ ⊆∈ L, there exist games G where the Price of
Anarchy is
PoA(G) = max
lk∈L
′,∀(x,t,i)k∈Ok
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k ,0<i6w
ĝkjlk(j)
ĝktlk(t) + jlk(j) − tlk(j + i)
(4)
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As a corollary from above note that every game G has a PoA lower bounded by the maximum
value of gk at an ordered triple, i.e PoA = Ω(g
∗
k) since the expression above equates to g
∗
k when
j = x for any (x, t, i)k ∈ Ok.
Theorem 1 compactly describes a necessary and sufficient condition for the boundedness of the
Price of Anarchy of any game with cost functions drawn from L. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first exact formulation of Price of Anarchy bounds (both lower and upper bounds) for
unsplittable congestion games with arbitrary latency cost functions. Previous results by Awerbuch
et al. and Monien et al. [3, 1] have provided a tight characterization for games with polynomial
latency cost functions. In [21], Roughgarden provides generalized existence conditions for the Price
of Anarchy of congestion games using smoothness characterizations. We demonstrate in this paper
for every superpolynomial cost function in L1 and L2, the existence of games for which the PoA is
unbounded and also provide a tight bound on the PoA for all games polynomially bounded latency
costs.
Result 2. The relation between the Price of Anarchy, latency cost functions and the number of
players is as follows:
1. For every superpolynomial cost function in L1 and L2, there exist congestion games where the
PoA is arbitrarily large and increases with the number of players even with bounded weights.
2. For every polynomially bounded congestion game (with latency functions drawn from L3), the
PoA is independent of the number of players and bounded only by the parameters of the cost
function.
Result 2 directly relates the Price of Anarchy of unsplittable congestion games to the growth
rates of the latency cost functions that control the player costs in these games. More significantly, it
has strongly negative implications for the Price of Anarchy of many such games. These implications
were heretofore unknown, as the only known results to date were on the Price of Anarchy of
congestion games with polynomial cost functions.
Our result implies that the Price of Anarchy is finite only for those games with latency cost
functions bounded by some polynomial. Latency costs growing faster than polynomial functions
have strongly negative consequences for the Price of Anarchy of every game with player costs
controlled by these functions. For every cost function in this class, there are games with unbounded
Price of Anarchy, even if the weights of all players are infinitesimally small.
Remark: The PoA is bounded for all games with latency functions from L3 such as the well-
known polynomial cost functions [3, 1] of degree d > 0 described by lk(x) =
∑d
q=0 aqx
q,. We show
in this paper that the PoA is bounded even for other polynomial bounded functions, for example,
lk(x) = (
∑d
q=0 aqx
q)(
∑m
q=0 bq log
q x).
The verdict on the existence of the Price of Anarchy for games with faster growing cost functions
is strongly negative. This includes both slowly growing super-polynomial cost functions such as
lk(x) = akx
logǫ x, ǫ > 0 as well as fast-growing exponential cost functions such as lk(x) = x! and
lk(x) = a
x, where a > 1.
3 Game Formulation
An unsplittable congestion game is a strategic game G = (Π,W,R,S, (lr)r∈R) where:
• Π = {π1, . . . , πN} is a non-empty and finite set of players.
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• Player weight set W ∈ R+ where each player πi has an associated weight wπi ∈ W (also
denoted as i later in the analysis), and the maximum player weight is w = maxπi∈Πwπi .
• R = {r1, . . . , rζ} is a non-empty and finite set of resources.
• Strategy profile S = Sπ1 ×Sπ2 × · · · × SπN , where Sπi is a strategy set for player πi, such that
Sπi ⊆ 2
R. Each strategy Sπi ∈ Sπi is pure in the sense that it is a single element from Sπi
(in contrast to a mixed strategy which is a probability distribution over the strategy set of
the player). A game state is any S ∈ S. We consider finite games which have finite S (finite
number of states).
In any game state S, let Sπi denote the strategy of player πi. We define the following terms with
respect to a state S: Congestion: Each resource r ∈ R has a congestion Cr(S) =
∑
πi∈Π∧r∈Sπi
wπi ,
which is the sum of the weights of the players that use it. Utility: In any game state S, each
resource r ∈ R has a utility cost (also referred to as latency cost) lr(S). Player Cost: In any game
state S, each player π ∈ ΠG has a player cost pcπi(S) =
∑
r∈Sπi
lr(S). Social Cost: In any game
state S, the social cost is SC(S) =
∑
r∈R lr(Cr(S)) ·Cr(S). Note that the social cost is the weighted
sum of the player’s costs.
When the context is clear, we will drop the dependence on S. For any state S, we use the
standard notation S = (Sπi , S−πi) to emphasize the dependence on player πi. Player πi is locally
optimal (or stable) in state S if pcπi(S) ≤ pcπi(S
′
πi , S−πi) for all strategies S
′
πi ∈ Sπi . A greedy
move by a player πi is any change of its strategy from S
′
πi to Sπi which improves the player’s cost,
that is, pcπi(Sπi , S−πi) < pcπi(S
′
πi , S−πi). A state S is in a Nash Equilibrium if every player is
locally optimal, namely, no greedy move is available for any player. A Nash Equilibrium realizes
the notion of a stable selfish outcome. In the games that we study there could exist multiple Nash
Equilibria.
A state S∗ is called optimal if it has minimum attainable social cost: for any other state S,
SC(S∗) ≤ SC(S). We quantify the quality of the states which are Nash Equilibria with the price of
anarchy (PoA) (sometimes referred to as the coordination ratio). Let P denote the set of distinct
Nash Equilibria. Then the price of anarchy of game G is:
PoA(G) = max
S∈P
SC(S)
SC(S∗)
4 Preliminaries
Let S denote an arbitrary (not necessarily an equilibrium) state of game G with resource set R.
We group resources in R together based on congestion and cost parameters. Let Rtj,k ⊆ R denote
an equivalence class of resources such that for every r ∈ Rtj,k, we have Cr(S) = j, Cr(S
∗) = t and
latency costs governed by function lk(Cr(S)) ∈ L i.e the cost of using r ∈ R
t
j,k in states S and S
∗
are given by lk(j) and lk(t), respectively. For notational convenience, we label the set of resource
equivalence classes by E = {Rtj,k}.
For any resource r ∈ R, let Πr = {π|r ∈ Sπ} and Π
∗
r = {π|r ∈ S
∗
π}. Let σi ⊆ Π denote the set
of players in Π with weight i, 0 < i 6 w and let αir = |σi
⋂
Π∗r| denote the number of players of
weight i utilizing resource r in the optimal state S∗. Thus
∑
i:σi 6=φ
i · αir = t for all r ∈ R
t
j,k.
For any t > 0, let f(t) be the total number of combinations of players of different weights which
can satisfy the equation
∑
i:σi 6=φ
i · αir = t, where f(t) can be an exponential function of t. We
denote a particular such player combination by the index ta, 1 6 a 6 f(t) and let R
ta
j,k ⊆ R
t
j,k
denote the equivalence class of resources with identical configurations of players in the optimal
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state as represented by ta. If t = 0, we will sometimes use the notation 00 to denote the empty
configuration. We represent the optimal configuration in state S∗ on any resource r ∈ Rtaj,k, by the
vector L¯taj,k =< {α
i,ta
j,k } >, where α
i,ta
j,k > 0 denotes the number of players of weight i in configuration
ta on resource r in optimal state S
∗. Henceforth we use the notation i ∈ L¯taj,k to denote the presence
of a player of weight i in configuration ta, i.e if α
i,ta
j,k > 0.
We derive our PoA bound by obtaining a constrained maximization formulation of the PoA
using resource equivalence classes that can then be bounded. In particular, consider the term
|Rtaj,k|iα
i,ta
j,k lk(t) representing resource equivalence class R
ta
j,k. This term represents the net contribu-
tion of all players of a given weight i occupying the subset of resources Rtaj,k towards the optimal
social cost. More formally define the terms
λi,taj,k =
|Rtaj,k| · i · α
i,ta
j,k lk(t)
SC(S∗)
, Rtj,k ∈ E , t > 0, 1 6 a 6 f(t), i : σi ∈ Π, (5)
λi,0j,k =
|R0j,k|
SC(S∗)
, R0j,k ∈ E , i : σi ∈ Π. (6)
Each term of Eq. 5 represents the fractional net contribution of players of weight i occupying
resources in Rtaj,k with t > 0 towards the optimal social cost SC(S
∗). However as shown in the
lemma below, these terms also represent exactly the contribution of these players towards the total
Price of Anarchy. Also, Eq. 6 is defined for arbitrary i for consistency with Eq. 5, however in
actuality i can be assumed 0 since there are no players of any weight on resources in R0j,k in the
optimal state.
Denote the coordination ratio of any unsplittable congestion game G as H(S) = SC(S)/SC(S∗)
for arbitrary state S and optimal state S∗. The following lemma relates the coordination ratio to
the coefficients λi,taj,k .
Lemma 1. Given any game state S, the coordination ratio H(S) of an unsplittable congestion
game with latency cost functions derived from class L can be expressed as
H(S) =
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
λi,taj,k ·
j
t
·
lk(j)
lk(t)
+
∑
R0
j,k
∈E
λ0,0j,k · j · lk(j) (7)
where∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
λi,taj,k = 1 (8)
λ0,0j,k > 0 (9)
Proof: Please see Appendix.
Let P denote the set of Nash equilibrium states of G. Then from the definition of the Price of
Anarchy, we have
PoA(G) = max
S∈P
H(S) (10)
Note that for any group of resources Rtj,k, the term
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
represents the localized PoA. Thus
given constraint 8 we can also view the overall PoA of the game as the average of the localized
PoA’s on each resource class. Also note that while the λi,taj,k , t > 0, terms representing actual
optimal player configurations are constrained, the λ0,0j,k terms representing resources contributing to
the equilibrium cost but not the optimal are not. However as shown later they cannot be too large.
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5 Price of Anarchy Lower Bounds
For any arbitrary cost function in L, we describe a specific game which bounds the Price of Anarchy
from below. Consider a game G = (Π,W,R,S, lk), where lk ∈ L and players Π = {π1, . . . , πN} such
that every player has a demand of weight exactly w ∈ W . The set of resources R, where ζ = |R|,
can be divided into two disjoint sets R = A ∪ B, A ∩ B = ∅, such that A = {a0, . . . , aζ1−1} and
B = {b0, . . . , bζ2−1}, that is, ζ = ζ1 + ζ2.
Consider parameters α, β, γ, δ ≥ 0, such that ζ1 ≥ α + β, and ζ2 ≥ γ + δ. Each player
πi has two strategies Sπi = {si, si}. Strategy si occupies α consecutive resources from the
set A, sAi = {a(i−1) mod ζ1 , . . . , a(i+α−1) mod ζ1}, and β consecutive resources from B, s
B
i =
{b(i−1) mod ζ2 , . . . , b(i+β−1) mod ζ2}; namely, si = s
A
i ∪ s
B
i . Strategy si occupies γ consecu-
tive resources from the set A such that the first resource is immediately after the last in sAi ,
sAi = {a(i+α−1) mod ζ1 , . . . , a(i+α+γ−1) mod ζ1}, and δ consecutive resources from B, such that the
first resource is immediately after the last in sBi , s
B
i = {b(i+β−1) mod ζ2 , . . . , b(i+β+δ−1) mod ζ2};
namely, si = s
A
i ∪ s
B
i .
We consider the game state S = (s1, . . . , sN ) which consists of the first strategy of each player,
and game state S = (s1, . . . , sN ) which consists of the second strategy of each player. We take the
number of players N = κ1ζ1 and N = κ2ζ2, for integers κ1, κ2 ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. State S is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Please see Appendix.
As observed in the proof of Lemma 2, in state S each resource r ∈ A has congestion equal to
j1 = Cr(S) = Nαw/ζ1, and each resource r ∈ B has congestion equal to j2 = Cr(S) = Nβw/ζ2.
Similarly, in state S each resource r ∈ A has congestion equal to t1 = Cr(S) = Nγw/ζ1, and each
resource r ∈ B has congestion equal to t2 = Cr(S) = Nδw/ζ2. Similar to the previous section, we
define parameters λ1, λ2 ≥ 0, such that λ1 + λ2 = 1 and:
λ1 =
ζ1t1lk(t1)
ζ1t1lk(t1) + ζ2t2lk(t2)
, λ2 =
ζ2t2lk(t2)
ζ1t1lk(t1) + ζ2t2lk(t2)
.
From Lemma 2, we have that S is a Nash equilibrium, and thus, for any player i, pcπi(S) ≤ pcπi(S
′).
With an appropriate choice of the game parameters (α, β, γ, δ, ζ1, ζ2, κ1, κ2) and also by adjusting
the weight w which is a real number, we can actually get pcπi(S) = pcπi(S
′) for each player πi ∈ Π.
In other words,
α · lk(j1) + β · lk(j2) = γ · lk(j1 + w) + δ · lk(j2 + w).
Therefore,
ζ1j1 · lk(j1) + ζ2j2 · lk(j2) = ζ1t1 · lk(j1 + w) + ζ2t2 · lk(j2 +w),
and hence,
ζ1j1 · lk(j1)− ζ1t1 · lk(j1 + w) = ζ2t2 · lk(j2 + w)− ζ2j2 · lk(j2),
or equivalently,
λ1 ·
j1lk(j1)− t1lk(j1 + w)
t1lk(t1)
= λ2 ·
t2lk(j2 +w) − j2lk(j2)
t2lk(t2)
,
which gives,
λ1 ·
[
j1lk(j1)
t1lk(t1)
−
lk(j1 + w)
lk(t1)
]
= λ2 ·
[
lk(j2 + w)
lk(t2)
−
j2lk(j2)
t2lk(t2)
]
. (11)
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Lemma 3. For game G, the price of anarchy is bounded by:
PoA(G) > max
g∗k, max
(j1,t1,w)>(x,t1,w)k
∀(x,t1,w)k∈Ok
ĝkj1lk(j1)
ĝkt1lk(t1) + j1lk(j1)− t1lk(j1 + w)
 .
Proof: Please see Appendix.
6 Price of Anarchy Upper Bounds
6.1 Constrained Maximization
Let S be any Nash equilibrium state of G. We find the upper bound on the PoA via the lemma
below in which we convert the unconstrained maximization of Eq. 7 into a constrained version.
Consider an arbitrary resource equivalence class Rtaj,k in state S of G. For any player of weight
i ∈ L¯taj,k, 0 < i 6 min(t, w), define
f i,taj,k =
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
−
lk(j + i)
lk(t)
, (12)
f0,0j,k = jlk(j) (13)
Also let gi,taj,k = −f
i,ta
j,k . We first define the notion of underloaded and overloaded resource sets
conditioned on the value of f i,taj,k .
Definition 3. Resource subset Rtaj,k is defined to be overloaded with respect to players of weight
i if f i,taj,k > 0 and underloaded if f
i,ta
j,k < 0 (g
i,ta
j,k > 0). Define F = {f
i,ta
j,k : f
i,ta
j,k > 0} and
T = {gi,taj,k : g
i,ta
j,k > 0}.
It can be seen that the first term in the definition of f i,taj,k above is related to the overall social cost
of players using resource class Rtaj,k while the second term is related to the cost of a player of weight
i switching to a resource in Rtaj,k from its current strategy. Thus the magnitude of the function f
i,ta
j,k
is an indicator of the contribution of the corresponding resource class Rtj,k to the overall Price of
Anarchy and also indicates the excess load over the switching costs in that resource class. However
for any equilibrium state S, the switching costs must exceed the players costs when taken over all
resource classes and thus the weight of the overloaded resource classes must be constrained by the
underloaded resource classes, as we show through the lemma below.
Lemma 4. Let S ∈ P be any Nash equilibrium state of game G. Then we must have,∑
R0
j,k
∈E
λ0,0j,kf
0,0
j,k +
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯
ta
j,k
∑
f i,ta
j,k
∈F
λi,taj,k f
i,ta
j,k 6
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯
ta
j,k
∑
gi,ta
j,k
∈T
λi,taj,k g
i,ta
j,k (14)
Proof: Please see Appendix.
Next in order to bound the PoA objective function, we relate the functions f i,taj,k and g
i,ta
j,k above
to the ordered triples of any latency function lk(). From the definition of ordered triples in Eq. 1,
we obtain
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Lemma 5. Let (x, t, i)k ∈ Ok be any ordered triple of function lk(). Then we must have, (j, t, i) <
(x, t, i)k ∈ Ok for all g
i,ta
j,k ∈ T and (j, t, i) > (x, t, i)k ∈ Ok for all f
i,ta
j,k ∈ F .
Rewriting lemma 4 using lemma 5 above and combining with Eq. 10, the upper bound on the
PoA can therefore be expressed as the following constrained maximization:
Definition 4 (Maximization Problem).
PoA 6 max
S∈P
H(S) :=
∑
R0
j,k
∈E
λ0,0j,k · jlk(j) +
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k ·
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
+
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)<(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k ·
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
(15)
s.t∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k f
i,ta
j,k 6
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)<(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k g
i,ta
j,k (16)
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
λi,taj,k = 1 (17)
λ0,0j,k > 0 (18)
The following lemma provides an exact formulation for evaluating the upper bound on the PoA
of any game G by bounding the objective function H(S) for any equilibrium state S.
Lemma 6.
PoA(G) 6 max
g∗k, max
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
∀(x,t,i)k∈Ok
ĝkjlk(j)
ĝktlk(t) + jlk(j)− tlk(j + i)

Proof: Please see Appendix.
7 PoA: Functional Characterizations
Now we can combine the lower and upper bounds for the PoA as derived in lemma 3 and lemma 6
to get the tight bounds described in Eq. 1 of Result 1. Next we bound the expression in Eq. 1 for
arbitrary latency functions lk().
Theorem 1. For every latency function lk ∈ L1, there exist congestion games with arbitrarily large
PoAs depending only on the number of players.
Proof. First consider the following example where i = 1 and lk(x + 1) > xlk(x) (for example,
latency functions such as lk(x) = x! or lk(x) = x
x). Note that in these cases, ordered triples do not
exist since tlk(x+ 1) > xlk(x) for all t > 1. For such functions, ĝk = maxx,t>1
(
lk(x+i)
lk(t)
− xlk(x)tlk(t)
)
is
unbounded and therefore so is g∗k. Since the PoA > g
∗
k it is also unbounded.
Consider a more general example of latency functions in L1 where ordered triples exist. Given
any i > 0, let limx→∞
lk(x+i)
lk(x)
= 1+δ, δ > 0 is a constant independent of t. Choose an ordered triple
(x, t, i) such that tlk(x+ i) = xlk(x) and lk(x+ i) > (1 + δ)lk(x). Thus x > (1 + δ)t. Substituting
8
in the expression for the PoA above with j = x, we have the PoA > xlk(x)tlk(t) . Choose t large enough
so that
PoA >
lk ((1 + δ)t)
lk(t)
=
lk(t+ δt)
lk(t+ δt− i)
·
lk(t+ δt− i)
lk(t+ δt− 2i)
· · ·
lk(t+ i)
lk(t)
> (1 + δ)δt/i
From Section 5, since t is controlled by the number of players in the game which can be
arbitrarily large while player weight i is bounded by a given constant w, the PoA is unbounded.
Theorem 2. For every latency function lk ∈ L2, there exist congestion games with arbitrarily large
PoA depending only on the number of players.
Proof. Let t0 ∈ R
+ be a sufficiently large constant. Consider ordered triples (x, t, i)k ∈ Ok with
t > t0, x > t, for cost function lk() ∈ L2. We can safely assume that
lk(x)
lk(t)
is bounded for all
t > t0, else the PoA is unbounded as g
∗
k ≥
xlk(x)
tlk(t)
is unbounded. Assume lk(x)lk(t) 6 κ for all t > t0 or
equivalently
log1+ǫ x− log1+ǫ t 6 log κ,∀t > t0 (19)
Also limx→∞ lk(x + i)/lk(x) = 1 and lk(x + i)/lk(x) = x/t, which implies ∃ǫt → 0 such that
x = (1 + ǫt)t.
Since g∗k is assumed bounded and jlk(j) > tlk(j + i) for all j > x : (x, t, i)k ∈ Ok, we can bound
the PoA expression in Eq. 1 as
PoA = Ω
 max
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
∀(x,t,i)k∈Ok
ĝktlk(j + i))
ĝktlk(t) + jlk(j)− tlk(j + i)
 (20)
Denote the term above by y. Taking the partial derivative of y with respect to j and equating
it to 0 gives us
∂y
∂j
∣∣∣∣
0
=⇒ ĝktl(t)− jlk(j) = (lk(j + i))
(jlk(j))
′
tl′k(j + i)
(21)
where ()′ denotes the partial derivative with respect to j.
For any given value of t : (x, t, i)k ∈ Ok, y is maximized for j > x that satisfies Eq. 21
Substituting this in Eq. 20 and simplifying we get
PoA > max
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
∀(x,t,i)k∈Ok
ĝk
(jlk(j))
′
t·l′
k
(j+i)
− 1
(22)
Let αi(j) = l
′
k(j + i)/lk(j + i), i > 0. Using the fact that αi(x) = (1 + ǫ)
logǫ(x+i)
x+i , i > 0 for
lk(x) = ake
log1+ǫ x, we have
(jlk(j))
′
t · l′k(j + i)
− 1 =
α0(j) + 1/j
αi(j)
·
jlk(j)
tlk(j + i)
− 1
=
(
1 +
i
j
)(
1 + (1 + ǫ) logǫ j
(1 + ǫ) logǫ(j + i)
)(
jlk(j)
tlk(j + i)
)
− 1
6
(
1 +
i
j
)(
1 +
1
(1 + ǫ) logǫ j
)(
j
t
)
− 1 (23)
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Similarly Eq. 21 can be simplified as
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
=
ĝk · αi(j)
α0(j)− αi(j) + 1/j
6 ĝk
1 + ǫ
1 + i/j
logǫ(j + i) 6 β logǫ(j + i) (24)
where β = (1 + ǫ)ĝk is a constant dependent only on the parameters of latency function lk(x).
Since j ≥ x where (x, t, i)k is an ordered triple, let j = γx where γ > 1 and x = (1 + ǫt)t as
defined earlier. Substituting in Eq. 24, we get
γ(1 + ǫt)e
log1+ǫ(γx)−log1+ǫ t
6 β logǫ(γx+ i)
⇒ log γ + (log γ + log x)1+ǫ − log1+ǫ t 6 log β + ǫ log log(2γx)
⇒ log γ + ǫ′ log γ log x+ log1+ǫx− log1+ǫ t 6 log β + ǫ log log(2γx) (25)
where ǫ′ is a constant. Further substituting from Eq. 19, we get,
log γ(1 + ǫ′ log x) + log κ 6 log β + ǫ log log(2γx) (26)
⇒ log γ 6
ζ + ǫ log log 2γx
1 + ǫ′ log x
(27)
where ζ is a constant. Since ǫ, ǫ′ and ζ are constants and x can be chosen to be x ≫ i, we have
log γ = Θ( log log xlog x ) and so γ = Θ(1 +
log log x
log x ). Substituting for j/t = (1 + ǫt)γ in Eq. 23 we notice
that all the terms in the first expression on the RHS converge to 1. Further substituting this
expression in Eq. 22 for the PoA, we get PoA = Ω((1 + ǫ) logǫ j). Since the congestion j depends
on the number of players and can be arbitrarily large, we get the result as desired.
Finally we consider games from L3. [1] describes upper bounds for games with polynomial costs.
Here we we present a generalized result for all congestion games with latency functions drawn from
the class of polynomially bounded functions.
Theorem 3. For every congestion game with latency functions drawn from L3, the PoA is inde-
pendent of the number of players and bounded only by the parameters of the cost function (such as
the degree of the polynomial).
Proof: Please see Appendix.
8 Conclusions
We provide the first characterization for the price of anarchy of superpolynomial utilities in con-
gestion games. We provide tight bounds for a large family of utility functions and show how the
price of anarchy increases with the number of players, while other game parameters such as num-
ber of resources and player weights remain fixed. We also extend and generalize the previously
known bounds on games with polynomial utility functions to games with utility functions inclusive
of and bounded above by polynomials. Our results lead to several interesting open questions: by
restricting player strategy sets and network topologies, can we find interesting families of games
with bounded price of anarchy even with superpolynomial utilities? Another interesting problem
is to determine whether there are approximate games with bounded PoA.
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A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: After substituting the values of λi,taj,k from Eqs. 5 and Eq. 6 into the coordination
ratio H(S) in Eq. 7, we get,
H(S) · SC(S∗) =
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
|Rtaj,k|iα
i,ta
j,k
j · lk(j)
t
+
∑
R0
j,k
∈E
|R0j,k|j · lk(j)
H(S) · SC(S∗) =
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
r∈Rta
j,k
j · lk(j)
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
iαi,taj,k
t
+
∑
R0
j,k
∈E
∑
r∈R0
j,k
j · lk(j)
=
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
∑
r∈Rt
j,k
j · lk(j)
=
∑
r∈R
Cr(S) · lk(Cr(S))
= SC(S)
where we use the fact that
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
i · αi,taj,k = t for all values of optimal congestion t > 0. Similarly,
to prove constraint 8, note that
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
λi,taj,k · SC(S
∗)
=
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
|Rtaj,k · i · α
i,ta
j,k lk(t)
=
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
∑
r∈Rt
j,k
t · lk(t)
= SC(S∗)
✷
Proof of lemma 2: Since N is a multiple of ζ1 and ζ2, in state S each resource in A is utilized
by Nα/ζ1 = κ1α players, and each resource in B is utilized by Nβ/ζ2 = κ2β players. Therefore,
pcπi(S) =
∑
r∈si
lk(Cr(S)) =
∑
r∈sAi
lk(Cr(S)) +
∑
r∈sBi
lk(Cr(S)) = α · lk(κ1αw) + β · lk(κ2βw).
Let S′ = (si, S−πi) denote the state derived from S when player πi switches its strategy from
s to s. Since si ∩ si = ∅, each resource in r ∈ si will have congestion Cr(S
′) = Cr(S) + w, where
player πi adds weight w to r, while every other resource in R will have the same congestion in both
states. Consequently,
pcπi(S
′) =
∑
r∈si
lk(Cr(S
′)) =
∑
r∈sAi
lk(Cr(S
′)) +
∑
r∈sBi
lk(Cr(S
′)) = γ · lk(κ1αw+w) + δ · lk(κ2βw+w).
In order to prove that S is a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that pcπi(S
′)− pcπi(S) ≥ 0.
We have,
pcπi(S
′)− pcπi(S) = γ · lk(κ1αw +w) + δ · lk(κ2βw + w)− α · lk(κ1αw)− β · lk(κ2βw).
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Therefore, we only need to show that:
α · lk(κ1αw) − γ · lk(κ1αw +w) ≤ δ · lk(κ2βw + w)− β · lk(κ2βw). (28)
If α · lk(κ1αw)− γ · lk(κ1αw +w) ≤ 0, then by taking δ = β, since lk is a non-decreasing function,
we get δ · lk(κ2βw + w)− β · lk(κ2βw) ≥ 0; hence, Eq. 28 holds.
If α · lk(κ1αw) − γ · lk(κ1αw + w) > 0, then by setting β = β
′ζ2/ζ1, and δ = δ
′ζ2/ζ1, for some
β′, δ′ ≥ 0, and we get:
δ · lk(κ2βw + w)− β · lk(κ2βw) = δ
′ ζ2
ζ1
· lk
(
κ2β
′ ζ2
ζ1
w + w
)
− β′
ζ2
ζ1
· lk
(
κ2β
′ ζ2
ζ1
w
)
.
Then, Eq. 28, is equivalent to:
ζ1 (α · lk(κ1αw)− γ · lk(κ1αw + w)) ≤ ζ2
(
δ′ · lk
(
κ2β
′ ζ2
ζ1
w +w
)
− β′ · lk
(
κ2β
′ ζ2
ζ1
w
))
.
For taking ζ2 ≥ κ1αζ1, and by setting δ
′ and β′ such that δ′ − β′ ≥ (α− γ)/(κ1α), we get:
ζ2
(
δ′ · lk
(
κ2β
′ ζ2
ζ1
w + w
)
− β′ · lk
(
κ2β
′ ζ2
ζ1
w
))
≥ ζ2(δ
′ − β′)lk
(
κ2β
′ ζ2
ζ1
w
)
≥ ζ1(δ
′ − β′)lk(κ2β
′κ1αw)
≥ ζ1(α− γ)lk(κ1aw +w)
≥ ζ1 (α · lk(κ1αw) − γ · lk(κ1αw + w)) ,
as needed. ✷
Proof of lemma 3: From Lemma 2, state S is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
PoA(G) ≥
SC(S)
SC(S)
=
∑
r∈R lk(Cr(S))∑
r∈R lk(Cr(S))
=
∑
r∈A j1lk(j1) +
∑
r∈B j2lk(j2)∑
r∈A t1lk(t1) +
∑
r∈B t2lk(t2)
=
ζ1j1lk(j1) + ζ2j2lk(j2)
ζ1t1lk(t1) + ζ2t2lk(t2)
=
ζ1t1lk(t1)
ζ1t1lk(t1) + ζ2t2lk(t2)
·
j1lk(j1)
t1lk(t1)
+
ζ2t2lk(t2)
ζ1t1lk(t1) + ζ2t2lk(t2)
·
j2lk(j2)
t2lk(t2)
= λ1 ·
j1lk(j1)
t1lk(t1)
+ λ2 ·
j2lk(j2)
t2lk(t2)
≥ λ1 ·
j1lk(j1)
t1lk(t1)
.
Since λ1 + λ2 = 1, from Eq. 11 we can get that
λ1F = (1− λ1)ĝk,
where
F =
j1lk(j1)
t1lk(t1)
−
lk(j1 + w)
lk(t1)
,
and ĝk is obtained from Eq. 3 such that it maximizes
lk(j2 + w)
lk(t2)
−
j2lk(j2)
t2lk(t2)
.
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Consequently,
λ1 =
ĝk
F + ĝk
.
Therefore,
PoA(G) ≥ λ1 ·
j1lk(j1)
t1lk(t1)
=
ĝkj1lk(j1)
ĝkt1lk(t1) + j1lk(j1)− t1lk(j1 +w)
. (29)
A lower bound on the price of anarchy follows by considering all ordered triplets of the form
(j1, t1, w) that maximize the right hand in Eq. 29. A second lower bound for the price of anarchy
is g∗k, defined in Eq. 2, for the case where λ1 = 1. ✷
Proof of lemma 4: Substituting above for λi,taj,k , g
i,ta
j,k and f
i,ta
j,k from Eqs. 5 and 12 and simplifying,
we need to prove:
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
f(t)∑
a=1
|Rtaj,k|
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
i · αi,taj,k
(
jlk(j)/t − lk(j + i)
)
+
∑
R0
j,k
∈E
|R0j,k| · jlk(j)
SC(S∗)
6 0 (30)
Since SC(S∗) > 0, consider the numerator. We use the following simple observation∑
r∈Rt
j,k
∑
i:π∈Πr∧π∈σi
i · lk(j) = |R
t
j,k| · j · lk(j) ∀R
t
j,k ∈ E (31)
since each player π ∈ σi contributes i towards the equilibrium congestion value j of every resource
r ∈ Rtj,k that is contained in its equilibrium strategy Sπ and each such resource contributes lk(j)
towards its player cost.
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
f(t)∑
a=1
|Rtaj,k| · j · lk(j)
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
iαi,taj,k
t
+
∑
R0
j,k
∈E
|R0j,k| · j · lk(j)
−
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
f(t)∑
a=1
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
|Rtaj,k|iα
i,ta
j,k lk(j + i)
≡
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
|Rtj,k| · j · lk(j)−
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
f(t)∑
a=1
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
|Rtaj,k| · iα
i,ta
j,k lk(j + i)
=
∑
Rt
j,k
∈E
∑
r∈Rt
j,k
 ∑
i:π∈Πr∧π∈σi
i · lk(j) −
∑
i:π∈Π∗r∧π∈σi
i · lk(j + i)
 (32)
=
∑
r∈R
∑
i:π∈Πr∧π∈σi
i · lr(Cr)−
∑
r∈R
∑
i:π∈Π∗r∧π∈σi
i · lr(Cr + i) (33)
=
∑
0<i6w
∑
π∈σi
i · pcπ(Sπ, S−π)−
∑
0<i6w
∑
π∈σi
i · pcπ(S
∗
π, S−π) (34)
6 0 (35)
where the first term of Eq. 32 uses Eq. 31. The second term follows from the fact that for each
resource r ∈ Rtaj,k there are exactly α
i,ta
j,k players of weight i that contain r in their optimal strategies
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and lk(j+i) represents the cost to each such player of switching to resource r while all other players
remain in state S. The left term of Eq. 33 represents i times the cost to a player of weight i of any
resource in R in state S while the right term represents i times the switching cost to any resource
in Rtj,k summed up over all resources. Eq. 34 represents the summation of player costs in state
S and the switching cost to state S∗ over all resources and then over all players. Finally Eq. 35
follows since S is a Nash equilibrium. ✷
From the definition of g∗k in Eq. 2 and using jlk(j) < tlk(j + i) for all (j, t, i) < (x, t, i)k along
with constraint 17, we have
Lemma 7. ∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)<(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k ·
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
6 g∗k
Also from the LHS of lemma 4 and the definition of ĝ in Eq. 3, we get
Lemma 8. ∑
R0
j,k
∈E
λ0,0j,k · jlk(j) 6 ĝk
Proof of lemma 6: Applying lemmas 7 and 8 to the objective function H(S) in 15 we have
H(S) 6 ĝk + g
∗
k +
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k ·
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
For every ordered triple (x, t, i)k ∈ Ok and any (j, t, i) > (x, t, i)k define λ̂
i,ta
j,k = ĝk/(ĝk + f
i,ta
j,k )
and Ŵ i,taj,k = λ̂
i,ta
j,k
jlk(j)
tlk(t)
. Letting W ∗ = max(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k Ŵ
i,ta
j,k we can rewrite the expression above
as,
H(S) 6 ĝk + g
∗
k +W
∗
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k
(
1 +
f i,taj,k
ĝk
)
Using the RHS of lemma 4 to bound the last term above, we get
H(S) 6 ĝk + g
∗
k +W
∗

∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k +
1
ĝk
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
i∈L¯ta
j,k
∑
(j,t,i)<(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k g
i,ta
j,k

6 ĝk + g
∗
k +W
∗
∑
Rta
j,k
∈E
∑
i∈L¯ta
j,k
 ∑
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k +
∑
(j,t,i)<(x,t,i)k
λi,taj,k

6 ĝk + g
∗
k +W
∗
= ĝk + g
∗
k + max
(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k
∀(x,t,i)k∈Ok
ĝkjlk(j)
ĝktlk(t) + jlk(j) − tlk(j + i)
(36)
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Note that if ordered triples exist for the cost function lk(), then since j
∗lk(j
∗) = t∗lk(j
∗ + i∗)
and j
∗lk(j
∗)
t∗lk(t∗)
= g∗k and (j, t, i) > (j
∗, t∗, i∗)k we must have max(j,t,i)>(x,t,i)k,∀(x,t,i)k∈Ok W
∗ > g∗k > ĝk
and so the last term dominates. However for rapidly growing cost functions, ordered triples may
not exist and so only the first two terms above are relevant. This leads to the expression in the
lemma as desired. ✷
Proof of lemma 2: Let z denote the PoA expression in Eq. 1. Taking the partial derivative ∂y∂j
and equating to 0 gives us
∂y
∂j
∣∣∣∣
0
=⇒ ĝklk(t) = lk(j + i)− jlk(j)
l′(j + i)
(jlk(j))′
(37)
Similarly evaluating the partial with respect to t gives
∂y
∂t
= α
(
lk(j + i)− ĝk(tlk(t))
′
)
(38)
where α > 0. Evaluating the two together it can be shown that ∂y∂t is decreasing in t and t = i at
the maximum value of z. Given 0 < i ≤ w, the bound on the PoA can then be obtained by solving
the following minimization using standard KKT conditions:
min
(
ĝk/
(
1−
tl′k(j + i)
(jlk(j))′
))
(39)
s.t
ĝkl(t) = lk(j + i)− jlk(j)
l′(j + i)
(jlk(j))′
(40)
jlk(j) ≥ tlk(j + i) (41)
0 < i ≤ w (42)
✷
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